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TANJA E. AALBERTS
THE SOVEREIGNTY GAME STATES PLAY: (QUASI-)STATES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
ABSTRACT. This article discusses the puzzle of sovereign statehood in the context
of state failure and anarchy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the ﬁrst section it suggests to
analyse sovereignty as a discursive fact in terms of a Wittgensteinian language game.
This renders recognition a pivotal element and rejects foundationalist notions of
sovereignty. The second section analyses the quasi-statehood narrative’. Whereas
this narrative presents sovereignty as a game, it applies two diﬀerent notions of
games concomitantly. This article argues that the notion of quasi-statehood
maintains an empirical kernel as the core of ‘real’ sovereign statehood and as
such remains within the conventional sovereignty discourse. The epilogue states that
such foundationalism is not an innocent analytical move. It shows how language can
have far-reaching political impact in terms of legitimation of political actions, and
how, ultimately, the conventional discourse drains international relations of its
content. This will be illustrated by U.S. position to state failure in their War on
Terrorism.
1. INTRODUCTION
To speak of sovereignty . . .is never to name something that already is. It can never be
to refer to some source of truth and power that is self-identical, that simply exists on
its own, that goes without saying1
Paradoxically, the core concepts of IR work to drain international relations of their
content!2
Despite (or due to?!) its death long and often foretold, sovereignty
continues to boggle the minds of International Relations and
International Law scholars and practitioners alike. Apart from
issues like globalisation and European integration, it is the condi-
tion of postcolonial statehood, and more speciﬁcally its failures,
1 Ashley, R.K. and Walker, R.B.J., ‘‘Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the
Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies’’, Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 34/3 (1990), 367–416, at 381.
2 Barkawi, T. and Laﬀey, M., ‘‘Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International
Relations’’, Millennium 31/1 (2002), 109–127, at 112.
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law
Revue Internationale de Se´miotique Juridique 17: 245–257, 2004.
 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
which keep us occupied. If sovereignty connotes a distinction
between inside and outside, combining internal order with external
anarchy, the lawlessness found within predominantly postcolonial
states stands at loggerheads with everything sovereignty is believed
to entail.3
Here too, 9/11 has left its mark. Not only has it pushed the ﬁght
against ‘rogue states’ again to the top of the international agenda,4 it
has also (re)conﬁrmed the urgency of the problem of state failure in
relation to the threat of terrorism. Whereas state collapse and failure
formerly used to be regarded as the internal business of the respective
states, and part of their responsibility as sovereign entities, now the
acknowledgement has risen that state failure not only bears upon the
well-being of the citizens concerned (which often has proven to be not
good enough a reason for international action), but its implications
reach further, i.e. to neighbouring states, regional security, and to the
‘global society’ at large. George W. has left no doubt about it:
‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones.’ Indeed, in the National Security Strategy there is an
explicit relationship between failing or weak states and terrorism:
‘The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as
strong states.’5 That these are not issues of mere ‘name-calling’, fol-
lows from the direct link between the labelling and the legitimation of
political actions: development assistance in the case of friends, con-
tainment in the case of foes.6 If sovereignty counts both as a con-
stitutive element of the international system, and a problem to be
overcome,7 in the aforementioned cases the focus is on the latter
feature.
3 For a standard (neorealist) formulation of the traditional distinction: Waltz,
K.N., Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a
poststructuralist analysis, see Walker, R.B.J., Inside/Outside: International Relations
as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4 For an account of the label ‘rogue state’, see W. Werner (this volume).
5 The National Security Strategy, September 2002, available at www.white
house.gov/nsc/nss.html.
6 For analyses along these lines, see the contributions by R. Lippens and by
R. van Munster (this volume). See also Bilgin, P., and Morton, A.D., ‘‘Historicising
Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social
Sciences?’’, Third World Quarterly 23/1 (2002), 55–80.
7 Walker, R.B.J., ‘‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/
Time’’, Millennium 20/3 (1991), 445–461, at 454.
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As it would more aptly be described by an ‘image of international
accord and civility and internal disorder and violence’,8 the condition
of postcolonial statehood in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa
indeed appears to turn the Westphalian rationale upside down and as
such consists of a major challenge to the fundaments of International
Relations (IR) as a discipline. In this context one might wonder what
meaning can be attributed to sovereignty, now that it can also signify
its opposite, i.e. a zone of anarchy.9 In order to come to grips with
this puzzling situation, this article advocates a move away from
foundational meaning and suggests to analyse sovereignty in terms of
a Wittgensteinian (language) game (Section 2), which renders rec-
ognition a pivotal element. In addition, it sheds a diﬀerent light on
the predominant doctrine on recognition. The so-called quasi-state-
hood narrative appears to appreciate the pivotal role of recognition
and as such appears suited to analyse sovereignty as a discursive
fact.10 However, whereas this persistent narrative has been celebrated
for its clarifying insights in the institution of sovereignty, it will be
argued that the analysis is entrenched in the conventional sovereignty
discourse and participates in the reconstitution of its descriptive fallacy.
As such, the analysis on quasi-statehood can serve as a representative
of a generation of essentialist readings of sovereignty (Section 3).
Linking this back to the issue of state failure in the era of terrorism,
Section 4 will show that such essentialism is not an innocent conceptual
fallacy, but has ideological consequences in terms of political legiti-
mation of circumscribing alleged key elements of sovereignty itself.
2. SOVEREIGNTY AS LANGUAGE GAME
As a central concept in International Relations, sovereignty has not
been short of attention. It can be conceived to have double signiﬁ-
cance: it fosters the distinction between domestic and international
politics on the one hand, while it simultaneously provides the
8 Jackson, R.H., and Rosberg, C.G., ‘‘Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood’’, World Politics 35 (1982), 1–24, at 24. See
also State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, September 30, 2000 –
released August 4, 2003 (available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail).
9 Doty, R.L., Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South
Relations (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), at 148.
10 The main analysis of this narrative is Jackson, R.H., Quasi-States: Sovereignty,
International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
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exclusive terms of reference to bridge the divide on the other.11 As
such it is often taken for granted as a core feature of states as the
main actors on the international plane. In conventional readings
sovereignty is rendered a matter of fact that can be measured and
determined (positivist empiricism). The focus is then on
‘identifying a class of properties as ‘‘essential’’ to statehood, thus demarcating
‘‘sovereignty’’ from deviant cases and eliminating obnoxious borderline cases by
searching for ever more ﬁnegrained qualitative diﬀerence. The desired outcome is a
clariﬁed concept, evident in its logical purity and by the empirical givenness of its
referent’.12
To put it diﬀerently, these readings apply an ‘image-like’ analysis
of sovereignty, rendering sovereignty a descriptive concept that
mirrors a corresponding state of aﬀairs in reality, which exists inde-
pendently of this representation.13
From the late 1980s onwards critical analyses emerged which
questioned the common practice of reiﬁcation of the state within the
discipline.14 Moving away from positivism, these approaches
emphasised the intersubjective nature of sovereignty, which conse-
quently should be validated as an institutional fact,15 constructed
within and existing on account of a wider discursive framework.
Ensuing, the meaning of sovereignty is dependent upon its use.While
this meaning is often presented as being ﬁxed, we need to appreciate
the practices and discourses underlying and constituting the institu-
tion, in order to conceal the intersubjective disposition of sovereignty:
In eﬀect, sovereignty is a practical category whose empirical
contents are not ﬁxed but evolve in a way reﬂecting the active
11 Caporaso, J.A., ‘‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian,
Regulatory or Post-Modern?’’ Journal of Common Market Studies 34/1 (1996), 29–
52, at 35.
12 Bartelson, J., A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), at 14–15.
13 For such a reading, see Krasner, S.D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Thomson, J.E., ‘‘State Sovereignty
in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical
Research’’, International Studies Quarterly 39/2 (1995), 213–233. On the descriptive
fallacy, see Werner, W.G., and de Wilde, J.H., ‘‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’’,
European Journal of International Relations 7/3 (2001), 283–313.
14 For a classical deﬁnition of reiﬁcation, see Berger, P.L., and Luckmann, T., The
Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Penguin, 1991 [1966]), at 106.
15 For a deﬁnition of institutional facts, see Searle, J.R., The Construction of
Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), at 27.
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practical consensus among coreﬂective statesmen’.16 It is in this
context that we should take the statement that sovereignty never goes
without saying17 literally. And hence it is fruitful to analyse sover-
eignty in terms of a language game.
Ultimately, the analogy of language as a game relates back to the
later Wittgenstein. In fact, the move from positivism to post-positivist
approaches in IR theory resembles the shift Wittgenstein made in his
analysis of language as a neutral medium to represent the outer world
(correspondence notion) in theTractatusLogicos-Philosophicus (1922),
to the role of language in the construction of that very reality in
Philosophical Investigations (1958).18 As such, language is not just an
instrument to attach labels to the independent reality ‘out there’.
Rather, it is itself a form of action. Subsequently, in his later work the
emphasis is on meaning in use: ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the
language’ (PI I, para 43). In order to explicate this, Wittgenstein
compares language use to making a move in a game. Crucial to this
game analogy is that (structures of) meaning and understanding
depend on a system of shared rules. Without knowing the rules, one
cannot grasp themeaning and rationality of the action that is observed.
To understand the relationship between language–action–meaning,
one needs to diﬀerentiate between types of rules. Drawing upon Witt-
genstein, Searle elaborates this relationship in termsof ‘speechacts’ and
distinguishes between regulative and constitutive rules.19 The former
consist of everyday rules, which merely regulate activities, which exist
independent of and prior to these rules.With constitutive rules, it is the
rules that constitute the fact – they are the conditions of possibility of the
very activity, which could not happen or ‘be’ except for the deﬁning
rules (as set out by language). In this second sense words are constit-
utive of the world and hence can be conceived as deeds. Reality is not
ready-made, but is constructed, and made intelligible, through our
categorisations: ‘We construct worlds we know in a world we don’t’.20
16 Ashley, R.K., ‘‘The Poverty of Neorealism’’, International Organization 38/2
(1984), 225–286, at 272–273, n101.
17 See the epigraph to this paper by Ashley and Ruggie.
18 See also Fierke, K.M., ‘‘Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in
International Relations’’, International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002), 331–354.
19 Searle, Supra fn.15, at 27–28.
20 Onuf, N.G., World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and
International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), at 94,
36, 38.
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Hence, rather than focusing on a universally valid deﬁnition that
ﬁxes the meaning and content of sovereignty, the challenge lies with
elaborating how the meaning of sovereignty is negotiated out of
intersubjective actions within a normative framework, and how these
practices (re)construct state sovereignty.21 Sovereign statehood does
not exist independent of and prior to (state) practice and international
law, as its scope and meaning are constituted and regulated by dip-
lomatic practice and international legal discourse. As such sovereignty
is both the medium and the outcome of the practices of states.22 In the
ﬁnal analysis, what facilitates entities to behave as sovereign states is
the fact that other states allow them to, and accept them as equals.
This in turn renders recognition as the pivotal element for the exis-
tence of sovereign states within the international society.
In international jurisprudence the predominant position with
regard to recognition is the declaratory doctrine. According to this
reading an entity is a state when – as soon as – it meets the empirical
features linked to statehood, as listed in article 1 of the Montevideo
Convention (1933): ‘The State as a person of international law should
possess the following qualiﬁcations: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
deﬁned territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with other states’.23 In this case, recognition is but an
aﬃrmation of a pre-existing fact of statehood. As such it provides
evidence that a sovereign state has come into being, but it is itself not
instrumental of that birth.24 Hence, statehood is legitimised by the
fact of its existence rather than by the act of recognition as such. As
has been stated very clearly by the Arbitration Commission on
Yugoslavia: ‘the existence. . . of the state is a question of fact [and] the
eﬀects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory’.25 Ulti-
mately, then, sovereign statehood is based upon a corresponding
state of aﬀairs in reality, thus a descriptive concept.
However, drawing upon the above discussion of sovereignty as a
(language) game, it is not the facts that take the lead. After all, which
facts count in the ﬁrst place is dependent upon the wider discursive
21 See Biersteker, T.J., and Weber, C., ‘‘The Social Construction of State Sov-
ereignty’’, in C. Weber and T.J. Biersteker (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Con-
struct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–21, at 11.
22 Bartelson, J., Genealogy, Supra fn. 12, at 47.
23 135 LNTS, 1936, 19.
24 Grant, T.D., The Recognition of States. Law and Practice in Debate and Evo-
lution (Westport: Praeger, 1999), at xx.
25 Opinion No. 1 (92 ILR at 162, 165).
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context. As such it could be argued that recognition, to amend or
specify Kelsen’s famous deﬁnition, implies the ascertainment of a
not-yet-existent fact’.26 Important to note is that (recognition as)
‘state in the sense of international law’ is indeed the ascertainment of
a fact, but, and this is the crucial twist, that fact does not exist prior
to its ascertainment. Which, actually, renders it genuinely constitutive
– it creates, rather than merely regulates, the very possibility of
sovereign statehood, which does not exist prior to the statement of
recognition. Characteristic of constitutive rules is that they enable
what they appear to describe.27 As such, recognition is not a function
of ‘empirical statehood’. Rather, the relationship is the other way
around: the international society distributes these alleged qualities of
(sovereign) statehood’ to diﬀerent entities. This renders recognition
indeed a political act and a tool of statecraft.28 In this context law
serves as an instrument to distribute and discipline. Hence can be
maintained that it is the norm that creates the fact. The criteria for
and practices of recognition change depending on developments
within international society, but the constitutive nature of the rule,
i.e. (consequences) of recognition, remains.
This role of changing norms for recognition of sovereign state-
hood is indeed claimed to be pivotal in the emergence of so-called
quasi-states in the aftermath of a post-war moral revolution in the
international society.
3. THE QUASI-STATEHOOD NARRATIVE
Starting from the crisis of representation of sovereignty, the analysis
of ‘quasi-statehood’ presents an account of the emergence of newly
independent states during the process of decolonisation of the
African continent. This narrative revolves around a distinction
between empirical and juridical statehood. Central claim is that for-
mer African colonies came into independent existence merely as
juridical states based on recognition by the international community,
while they ‘. . . do not disclose the empirical constituents by which
26 As an advocate of the constitutive doctrine, Kelsen has described recognition as
‘[t]he procedure provided by general international law to ascertain the fact ‘‘state in
the sense of international law’’, in a concrete case.’ (Kelsen, H., Principles of Inter-
national Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966)).
27 See Werner and de Wilde, Supra fn. 13, at 291.
28 See Grant, Supra fn. 24.
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real states are ordinarily recognized.’29 Hence they are labelled quasi-
states. As juridical entities these states possess the same external
rights and obligations as other states, but this international person-
ality has been detached from any (other) empirical prerequisites.
Thus, with the emergence of these quasi-states the rules of the alleged
‘sovereignty game’ have been transformed, or it is argued.30 The
classical, positive criteria of sovereign self-government have been
abandoned, and decolonisation became much ado about nothing: it
had ceased to be a substantive enterprise and became a formality
focused on the transfer of so-called negative sovereignty, that is
‘freedom from outside interference: a formal-legal condition’.31 Many
of these new-born states did (and do) not expose anything close to
‘substantial and credible statehood’ in terms of the empirical criteria
of classical international law, hence the ‘juridical cart is now before
the empirical horse. . . [which] has changed the character of the sov-
ereignty game fundamentally and irrevocably’.32
The notion of the ‘quasi-sovereignty game’ at ﬁrst glance seems
well reconcilable with an understanding of sovereign statehood as a
discursive fact. After all, it is all about the acknowledgement of
recognition by fellow-states as crucial and intersubjective element in
the emergence of quasi-states, rendering membership of the interna-
tional society literally of existential importance. The new game indeed
appears to acknowledge that the identities of postcolonial subjects are
formed within a historically speciﬁc discursive framework. By
breaking the link between status (right to sovereignty) and capacities
(empirical statehood), the new rules appear to entail a shift away
from the Westphalian commonsense’33 of sovereign statehood and
move beyond the declaratory doctrine. However, this uncoupling
might not be as absolute as it seems. Underlying the practice of quasi-
statehood is an assumption that at a later stage positive sovereignty
will (have to) be developed. African states are quasi-states because,
29 Jackson, R.H., ‘‘Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: Inter-
national Jurisprudence and the Third World’’, International Organization 41 (1987),
519–549, at 526 [italics added, TEA].
30 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 1, 4, 21, 23.
31 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 97, 27.
32 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 23–5.
33 This term is derived from Grovogui, S.N., ‘‘Regimes of Sovereignty: Interna-
tional Morality and the African Condition’’, European Journal of International
Relations 8/3 (2002), 315–338.
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for the time being, they lack the features of what is called empirical
statehood: they possess
. . . ‘juridical statehood’ derived from a right of self-determination – negative sov-
ereignty – without yet possessing much in the way of empirical statehood, disclosed
by a capacity for eﬀective and civil government – positive sovereignty.34
Quasi-statehood could only be a temporary device for allowing the
newly independent entities an entry into the international order. Such
a claim would have to be made good’ through the development of
substantial statehood, or else these entities would fail’. This in turn
shows an (implicit) notion of a scale of statehood’ underlying the
analysis, and hence the modern discourse of progress, development
and civilization in accordance with the Western state-model.35
More crucially in the light of the previous discussion on sover-
eignty as a language game, is the question of what constitutes this
benchmark of ‘real statehood’. Allegedly, in the classical game the
juridical cart was right where it logically belongs – behind the
empirical horse. Players within the classical game are those who are
endowed with domestic authority and power and are therefore
credible internationally: empirical statehood.’36 Hence, (classical
sovereign) states exist prior to the game – are not deﬁned by the game
– which is only called into existence to ease their relationships. The
game then merely regulates pre-existing activities (namely, interna-
tional intercourse) of pre-existing actors, and the constitutive char-
acter with regard to the players as such is lost. As such international
law (be it natural or positive) is the child and not the parent of states,
and it presupposes the existence of empirical states’.37 In this read-
ing, the traditional sovereignty game is deﬁned by classical, given
states, which in turn deﬁne and change the game for the new entries.
Consequently, it can be argued that two rather diﬀerent notions of
games are used concomitantly, i.e. a rational choice game in the case
of the ‘classical sovereignty game’, and a language game (in the sense
of speech act theory) with regard to the postcolonial states.38 This
34 Jackson, Supra fn. 29, at 529 [italics added, TEA].
35 See also Doty, Supra fn. 9, at 155.
36 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 38.
37 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 52–53.
38 For a theoretical dialogue between rational choice and constructivism on their
notions of games, see Fierke, K.M., and Nicholson, M., ‘‘Divided by a Common
Language: Formal and Constructivist Approaches to Games’’, Global Society 15/1
(2001), 7–25.
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latter case entails a notion of the intersubjective quality of (quasi-)
states, and appreciates the constitutive function of the game in rela-
tion to the very being of the new players. Postcolonial states as such
are not self-standing structures, as their domestic foundations are
supported from above by international law – for the time being, at
least. The classical game, on the other hand, resembles a more
instrumental notion of games, where the identity of actors is given and
the game is played to ‘order the relations of states, prevent damaging
collisions between them, and. . . regulate the conﬂicts and restore the
peace. Playing is. . . pursuing foreign policy goals’.39 Similar to ra-
tional choice game theory, the actors are explicitly said to exist prior
to and independent of any game, and the old sovereignty game is only
regulative: it does not deﬁne its own players, but merely organises
their interactions. To put it diﬀerently, in this reading the sovereignty
game did not exist prior toWestphalia, because the central players (i.e.
states) did not exist. However, were the constitutive nature of sover-
eign statehood fully appreciated, the argument would be that the game
did not exist, hence players did not exist. As such it is not recognised
that the classical game is just as existential’ as the alleged new game –
it is about enabling one’s very being, creating the conditions of pos-
sibility of (sovereign) being’ at all.
Hence an essentialist notion of (empirical) statehood emerges
from this, at ﬁrst sight innovative, analysis, too. Whereas the
concept of quasi-statehood draws attention to the fact that, con-
trary to the disciplinary commonsense, sovereignty is not a unitary
category with a transhistorical, universal foundation,40 it wrongly
maintains an empirical kernel as the core element of ‘real’ sover-
eign statehood. Capacities are not disposed of, and basically sov-
ereignty is demarcated from deviant cases by focusing on
approximation to the empirically given referent: the modern, wes-
tern state.41 Quasi-statehood then consists of a provisional aber-
ration of the limited and reifying conception of the state as an
ahistorical, universal entity, allowed for by the accommodating
environment. As such, the analysis stays within the conventional
sovereignty discourse, linking sovereignty to empirical features (if
not prerequisites), hence covering up the discursive quality of
39 Jackson, Supra fn. 10, at 36.
40 See also Doty, Supra fn. 9, at 149.
41 See also Sidaway, J.D., ‘‘Sovereign excesses? Portraying postcolonial sover-
eigntyscapes’’, Political Geography 22/2 (2003), 157–175, at 166.
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sovereignty, as a continuous work-in-progress’. For sovereign
statehood, both in its ‘classical’ and ‘quasi’ variants, is a discursive
fact which depends on the constant maintenance, defence, attack,
reproduction, undermining and relegitimation through widely cir-
culated practices by diplomats, scholars and the like, which in turn
settle its empirical contents.42 Both classiﬁcations depend on an
intersubjective understanding of entities, which are constituted by
this very agreement.
In this sense, the modern state is not anymore ‘real’ than so-
called quasi-states. Such a post-positivist perspective then renders
the depiction of a (progressive) continuum or scale of statehood
without a theoretical basis. Alleged ‘pariahs’ like quasi, failed and
rogue states are as much part of the sovereignty discourse as the
‘empirical state’ (and vice versa). They are considered deviant cases
within a particular discursive framework, and in relation to a
(more or less implicit) prototype. Ignoring this context leads to the
depiction of sovereignty as an empirical and neutral concept, and
conceals that quasi’ (or ‘rogue’, or ‘failed’) is a normative and
quintessentially political predicate. While the process of decoloni-
sation is generally conceived to entail the globalisation of sovereign
equality, and as such to diﬀer dramatically from former imperial
practices,43 notions of quasi-statehood arguably consists of impe-
rialism by other means. Indeed history seems to repeat itself, as
there have been calls for neo-colonialism in order to save failed
states from worse – and, ultimately, from themselves.44
4. EPILOGUE
No doubt, sovereign statehood has proved to be a rather enduring
(stubborn) institution. Despite (indeed, due to!) its death repeatedly
foretold, it appears to live ever after – in some cases more happily
than in others, but that is beside the point here. Arguably, it is this
durability that has made conventional approaches oblivious to the
intersubjective core of these facts, resulting in reiﬁcation of the sov-
ereign state. This paper has argued that the quasi-statehood narra-
42 Walker, Supra fn. 3, 168; and Ashley, Supra fn. 16, at 272–273, n.101.
43 Jackson, Supra fn. 29, at 520.
44 See f. i. Helman, G.B., and Ratner, S.R., ‘‘Saving Failed States’’, Foreign Policy
89 (1992), 3–20. For critical analyses of such representations of postcolonial states,
see e.g. Bilgin and Morton, Supra fn. 6; Doty, Supra fn. 9.
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tive, too, bears upon the notion of sovereign statehood as ‘pure
presence, already in place’, and as such re-establishes the problematic
foundation on which sovereignty allegedly rests.45 Consequently,
rather than challenging the conventional sovereignty discourse, this
narrative eﬀectively participates in the relegitimation of its imposi-
tion. Both the classical state and its postcolonial replication are
reiﬁed, and hence the crisis of representation is re-established. Indeed,
given the assumed empirical kernel of ‘real statehood’ this discourse
renders sovereignty an institution that exists apart from international
practice. As such, it drains international relations of its content.
From the above discussion of sovereignty in terms of a language
game it follows that shifting the attention away from the traditional,
essentialist question of what sovereignty is and the attendant alleg-
edly ‘neutral’ way of depicting sovereignty, to ‘how does it work’,
opens up a new and potentially more fruitful empirical agenda. When
research focuses on what sovereignty does, it can expose how state
practice indeed applies the prototype of the Westphalian state in
order to discipline the members of the international order. The dis-
cursive fact of sovereignty serves as a constitutive norm. However,
whereas this nulliﬁes the essentialist distinction between the instances
of statehood, it does not render them void of meaning within the
international practice and legal discourse. Such a focus helps to re-
turn substance to international relations by considering the power
relations that underlie the notion of sovereignty and quasi-sover-
eignty, and the rights and duties states are subject(ed) to when they
are designated as ‘rogue’, ‘quasi’, or ‘failed’ states. As such, ‘sover-
eignty’ does not only entail an international status with comple-
mentary rights – it also ensues subjectivity, which can be used to
discipline states on the basis of the Westphalian ideal-type. In this
sense words ‘act’ not only in terms of bringing about sovereign
identity, but certain labels serve to legitimise political actions. This
dynamic is clearly at work in the war on terrorism. Not only has the
US extended its blacklist of ‘rogue states’, it is also said to have
launched a ‘new theory on Failed States’. According to this theory,
the deﬁnition of state failure should be extended to include those
states which have a high level of unemployment, lack a good edu-
cational system, and where development falls short. These circum-
45 Ashley, R.K., ‘‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique’’, Millennium 17/2 (1988), 227–262, at 231; Doty, R. L., Imperial
Encounters, Supra fn. 9, at 151.
TANJA E. AALBERTS256
stances would provide potential breeding nests for terrorism, and as
such failed, or weak, states are identiﬁed as direct threats to Ameri-
can national security. Consequently, this justiﬁes unilateral military
actions, or so it is argued.46 In short, failing to meet standards of
‘empirical statehood’ would legitimise the deferral of the key con-
stitutive principle of the international society of sovereign states: non-
intervention.
Hence, applying an essentialist notion of sovereign statehood,
distinguishing between ‘real’ and ‘quasi’-states is not an innocent
conceptual fallacy. It conceals sovereignty as a political practice, and
as such drains international relations of its content. Subsequently, it
also closes oﬀ the possibility to think of international community and
responsibility in non-sovereign terms. In relation to quasi-states and
state failure, it moves the attention away from the international
scene, and ignores the role of the external environment. In case of
state failure this holds that the cause and responsibility is an internal
one. If and when the role of the international community is included,
this is in a rather positive way, as the benevolent, the ‘good citizen’
who will help the postcolonial states out.47 Again, we might feel
tempted to add. For what is at stake, in the end, is nothing less than
how to deal with a practice which at least has the appearances of
(neo)colonialism in a postcolonial age, under the veil of sovereign
equality.
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